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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOAN B. MOORE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMP ANY OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

12388

BRIEF 0 F. RESPONDENT
1

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by a beneficiary to recover insurance benefits provided by an insurance policy on her
husband's life.

DISPOSITION IN LO"WER COURT
The lower court after return of a jury verdict for the
vlaintiff added interest in the sum of $2,506.67 and entered jndgnwnt in her favor for the total sum of
$14,506.67

RELUJF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the lower court judgment and its costs of this appeal.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties will be ref erred to as they appeared below. All italics in this brief have been added.
Although the defendant's statement of facts is
lengthy, defendant has failed to include much of the
evidence supporting the verdict and in effect has stated
the facts in the light most favorable to it ra!ther than
most favorable to the verdict as required on appeal.
For that reason its statement of facts is not accepted.
Sometime during the spring of 1967 Mr. Edward L.
Foster and another man, both insurance agents for
Prudential Insurance Company, went to the home of
Douglas G. Ridd to persuade him to reinstate a previous
insurance policy (R. 283-84, 375). Prudential agents had
often solicited additional insurance purchases from Mr.
Ridd (R. 283). In early July, as a result of Mr. Foster's
solicitations, Mr. Ridd reinstated one policy and made an
application for another policy of life insurance designating his wife, Joan B. Ridd, (now Joan B. Moore) as beneficiary (R. 370-71). Prudential issued the new policy No.
D-47-308-070 effective July 13, 1967 providing $2,000
basic coverage with an additjonal $10,000 in a disappearing term rider. E·xhibit 1-P. The policy was mailed from
the Prudential office in Los Angeles and arrived at Mr.
Foster's Salt Lake City office on Friday, the 21st of July
1967 (R. 287). Because of the holiday weekend Mr. Foster
made no effort to deliver the policy to Mr. Ridd.
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Mr. Foster could not have delivered the policy anyway because on Saturday, July 22, Mr. Ridd and his
family had gone to Bear Lakewith friends.
During the day Mr. Ridd installed carpet m the
friends' cabin, working until about 6:00 or 6:30 p.m.
(R. 293). He then went water skiing (R. 294). When he
returned from skiing he ate supper. Shortly thereafter
he became ill and went to the men's room and vomited
( R. 363). Then, when climbing into the camper to change
his clothes he fell to the ground twice (R. 294). Mr. Ridd
was then assisted into the back of the truck and driven
to the Bear Lake Memorial Hospital in Montpelier,
Idaho.
During the ride his breathing seemed normal
though his skin was gray colored and his eyes glassy (R.
295-97). At the hospital he was able to climb out of the
truck onto the stretcher and was then taken into the emergency room. ( R. 296, 364).
At the hospital he was attended to by Dr. Reed Rich
who, among other things, adimistered oxygen. (R.
297-98). Mr. Ridd died that evening about 11 :00 p.m.
(R. 298, 366). The death certificate signed by Dr. Rich
listed the cause of death as coronary thrombosis. Exhibit
2-P.
When the plaintiff n'turned to Salt Lake City she
informed Mrs. Foster of her husband's death (R. 288).
rrhe insnranee policy was deliYered to her sometime
thereafter.
3

About three months later Mr. Anderson, the Prudential branch manager, went to plaintiff's home and informed her that no payment would be made under the
policy because her husband had "died of a condition that
Dr. Jones told him was n1ining his heart and this is why
he died of a heart attack - and he knew this (R. 299)."
Payment was thus denied because of Mr. Ridd's alleged
failure to inform Prudential of a supposed heart condition.
In fact, Mr. Ridd had never gone to any doctor for
heart problems or had he ever been told he had any such
ailment (R. 301, 344, 353). Indeed Mr. Ridd was a very
active man who often engaged in outdoor activities and
demanding sports and no doctor had ever told him to restrict his physical activties in any way whatsoever (R.
287 -92, 354).
Suit was then brought to collect on the policy.
Prudential abandoned its heart ailment claims, instead
relying in its Answer on alleged concealment of epilepsy,
convlusions, dizzy spells, and loss on consciousness. SeP
defendant's Answer, paragraph 8 (R.23). Prudential's
new position as set forth in its Answer also chose a broad
attack on Mr. Ridd's health in general, stating that
neither of the physicians who had previously examined
Mr. Ridd had advised him that he was in good health,
"But on the contrary advised him that he was suffering
from epilepsy or cataplexy, which is a serious and incurable cerebral disease."
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At trial Prudential's epilepsy issue was abandoned
- with the main focus being upon whether Mr. Ridd had
cataplexy. See R. 321, 344.
Cataplexy is the term given to a condition experienced by persons who, upon great emotional stimulation,
usually laughing, temporarily lose their muscle tone.
There is no known medical explanation for this phenomIt cannot be said to be a cerebral disease (R. 350).
Mr. Ridd had experienced this loss of muscle tone
but only infrequently. Indeed he would forget about the
last occurrence until several months later when the situation again arose (R. 290). Mrs. Moore testified that
the situation usually lasted only three to four seconds
and that during this time her husband was fully conscious (R. 306).
Two doctors during the course of routine physical
examinations had discussed this loss of muscle tone with
.Mr. Ridd.
The first, Dr. vVarren Hughes, did not diagnose
cataplexy hut attributed the symptoms to hyperventiliation (R. 323, 333). A thorough physical did not reveal
ahnormalities and Dr. Hughes concluded Mr. Ridd to
he a normally developed and healthy man (R. 313,
330-31, 334).
Thirty-nine months later Mr. Ridd had another
physical examination from Dr. Robert E. Jones (R. 309,
;337). Dr . .Jones found nothing physically or neurologically wrong but diagnosed cataplexy on the basis of the
5

mt:dical history given him (R. 340-41). He told Mr. Ridd
he was in good health (R. 342). Dr. Jones te.stified that
with cataplexy there is no loss of consciousness or alertness, drowziness, or loss of bowel control (R. 343). He
further testified that such occurrences were not instantaneous but could be felt coming on (R. 345).
No question on Prudential's medical qnestionaire
mentions cataplexy. N eve1iheless, at trial Prudential
called Dr. Albert H. Domm, its Western Home Office
Medical Director, to testify that Prudential would not
have issued the policy had it known of Dr. Jones' diagnosis of cataplexy (R. 417). Dr. Domm admitted he had
had no personal experience with cataplexy (R. 447). He
further stated that, with respect to questions on an insurance application, all the company sought was a "sincere and honest answer" (R. 450). He further admitted
that with respect to an alleged misrepresentation by Mr.
Ridd on qustion 5-b of the application, it was proper for
a person who was not told he had a brain or nervous disorder to assume he did not have one as regards such
questions (R. 450-51).
Prudential did not offer into evidence its underwriting policies manual or did to call any witnesses from its
underwriting department to show that Mr. Ridd's policy
would not have been issued had cataplexy been mentioned
on the application. Significantly, Dr. Dornrn does not
work in the underwriting division of Prudential.
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Defendant also called Dr. August L. Jung, the doctor
employed by Prudential to t,'1Ye Mr. Ridd a preinsurance
physical. He admitted it was "very possible" for a person to have cataplexy and not know he had a mental or
nervous disorder (R. 414-15).
The matter was then submitted to the jury who, 37
minutes later, rendered a unanimous verdict for Mrs.
Moore (R. 471).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INSURANCE POLICY WAS IN EFFECT AT
THE TIME OF MR. RIDD'S DEATH.

Prudential argues that because Mr. Ridd did not
physically accept the insurance policy prior to his death,
it newr took effect by its own terms.
Though the policy does speak about acceptance it
does not clearly say physical manual acceptance is the
standard.
The requirement that a policy be accepted by an insured before taking effect can only reasonably be construed as legal acceptance and not physical acceptance.
Mr. Ridd was the applicant. When Prudential accepted Mr. Ridd's premimn and issued the policy effective July 13, 1967 it accepted Mr. Ridd's offer and a
contract was formed.
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As the terms of the policy issued were not different
than the terms of the policy applied for, it was not necessary for Mr. Ridd to physically accept the policy before
it became effective.
-When all of the terms of the contract have been
agreed upon between the applicant and the insnrance
company, the general rule is that acceptance of delivery
of the policy by the applicant is unnecessary to create a
contract.

Kra-use v. Washington National Insurance Co., 468
P.2d 513, 517 (Ore.1970), states the rule:
"As a general proposition, a contract of insurance is usually effected when an offer, in the form
of an application for insurance by the insured is
accepted by the insurance company."
* * *

Even if acceptance by Mr. Ridd were required, that
element was satisfied by the arrival of the policy at the
office of Mr. Foster prior to Mr. Ridd's death.
Mr. Ridd died on Saturday, July 22, 1967. On the
following Monday Mrs. Moore called Mr. Foster, the
soliciting agent, informed him of the death of her husband, and was told the policy had arrived Friday - a day
before Mr. Ridd died (R. 287). The policy had been issued effective July 13, 1967. See Exhibit 1-P.
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r:l'hongh Mr. Foster was Prudential's agent he is
also the agent of the insured for delivery of the policy.
Delivf'ry to the agent is legal delivery to the insured.
"If the premium is paid when the application
is presented, and such application is approved and
policy executed as of that date, and nothing remains but to deliver the paper to the insured, it
may well be held that the sending of it to the
agent to be by him given over to such insured
person constitutes a sufficient delivery in law ...
In other words, delivery in law is not necessarily
manual delivery." Lombard v. Columbia National
Life Insuramce Co., 50 Utah 554, 168 P. 269, 271
(1917).

* * *
"In addition, delivery of the policy, where required, is satisfied by its delivery to a broker or
other agent for the insured." Krause v. Washington National Insurance, supra, 468 P .2d at 519.
Prudential's efforts to avoid payment because Mr.
Ridd had not physically taken possession of the policy
prior to his death borders on the unconscionable.
If such an argument were valid an insurer could
charge a premium and have the use of an insured's money
risk whatsoever. This court
without incurring
should not give harbor to an illusory practice which takes
the prt>mium with one hand and rejects claims with

another.
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POINT II.
SECTION 31-19-8 UTAH CODE ANN. DOES NOT
BAR PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY.

Utah Code Ann.§ 31-19-8 states:

31-19-8. Representations in applications.(1) All statements and descriptions in any application for an insurance policy or annuity contract
or for the reinstatement or renewal thereof, by or
in behalf of the insured or annuitant, shall be
deemed to be representations and not warranties.
Misrepresentations, ommissions, concealment of
facts, and incorrect statements shall not pre:vent
a recovery under the policy or contract unle,ss:
(a) fraudulent; or
(b) material either to the acceptence of the
risk, or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or
(c) the insurer in good faith either would not
have issued the policy or contract, or would not
have issued, reinstated or renewed it at the same
premium rate, or would not have issued, reinstated or renewed a policy or contract in as large
an amount, or would not have provided coverage
with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss,
if the true facts had been mad known to the insurer as required either by the application for
the policy or contract or otherwise.
(2) If, in any action to rescind any policy or
contract or to recover thereon, any misrepresentation with respect to a medical impairment is
proved by the insurer, and the insured or any
other person having or claiming a riglit under the
contract shall prevent full disclosure and proof of
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the nature of the medical impairment, the misrepresentation shall be presumed to have been
material.
Prudential makes several incredible statements with
regard to this statute and the law of this case in general.
Among tht>m are:
"The statute . . . permits an omission or incorrect statement to defeat recovery if material
to acceptance of the risk, regardless of the applicant's good faith as to the error." (Prudential's
brief at 26).

* * *

"As before discussed, no jury question is presented by any of the statutory or common law
factors needed by defendant to defeat recovery."
Id. at 40.
Prudential's argnment absolutely rejecting any good
faith requirement as to this statute has disastrous public
policy implications while ignoring the language of the
sbtute itself. Combined with its assertions that an
action brought nnder this statute leaves nothing for the
jury, the total argument tends to destroy itself in its own
contradictions.
The first argument that an insurance applicant's
good faith and honesty has no application to this statute,
if true, would create a situation where every statement
on an
application, if it failed to conform to the
the ultimate fact could be the basis for a later refusal of
coverage no matter what any applicant may have, known
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or believed at the time. No one wonld ever know how
valid his insurance was. This makes such statements
warranties, - a standard the statute itself rejects:
"All statements and descriptions in any application for an insurance policy ... by or in behalf
of the insured ... shall be deemed to be representations and not warranties."

Marks v. Continental Casualty Co., 19 Utah 2d 119,
427 P.2d 387 (1967), shows that insurance benefits cannot be denied on the basis of misrepresentations unless
such misrepresentations were wilfully and knowingly
made:
"When one is charged with a falsehood or a
misrepresentation, in order for it to be actionable
or to deprive him of a right, it must be done wilfully and knowingly.

* * *

"We see nothing incongrous or irrational
about the trial court's view ... that the plaintiff
was sincere in her belief ... and consequently that
she did not wilfully and knowingly falsify he
answers." 427 P. 2d at 389.
See also Wooton v. Combined Insitrancc Co. of
America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 (1964), and Pritchett v. Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Co., 18
Utah 2d 279, 421P.2d943 (1966).
The cases cited by Prudential all relate to known and
intentional misrepresentations and concealment of facts.
In each instance the applicant knew or shonld have
known he had a serions condition.
12

In Robinson v. Occidenital Life Insurance Co., 281
P.2d 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955), the decedent had made no
less than 11 calls on his doctor during a three year period
for high blood pressure and it was clear he knew of the
seriousness of his condition.
Torbensen v. Family Life Insurance Co., 329 P.2d
596 (Cal. Ct. App.1958) involved the concealment of a
heart condition including the taking of an electrocardiogram and drug therapy.

In Con.tine11tal Ccisiialty Co. v. Milligam, 10 Ariz.
A pp. 491, 460 P .2d 27 ( 1969), the insured, a physician,
concealed 11 scheduled appointments with a heart disease
specialist and drugs prescribed mentioning only a nondisabling arthritis of the spine in response to a question
concerning medical advice received during the past ten
years.
The insnred in Jessen v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,
209 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1954) denied any disease or ailment
of the heart, blood vessels or lungs on a medical questionaire. The facts showed him to be under regular care for
fainting- spells and chest pains. His doctor had specifically told him he had coronary slerosis and angina pectoris, (both heart ailments) the latter causing his death.

Tlw three conditions mentioned in U.C.A. § 31-18-8
upon whieh recovery under an insurance policy can be
denied a11 present jury question in this case.
Tlw first condition focuses upon the intent of the
insured whereas the latter two on the company.
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The first reqmres fraud. The ''willfullness' and
"knowing" elements of fraud are historically jury issues.
The second and third deal with whether an omitted
fact is material to the acceptance of the risk and whether
the insurer in good faith would have issued the policy
''v,rith respect to the hazard resulting in the loss." Materiality and an insurer's good faith also present jury issues.
Prudential's argument that none of these present
jury issues can only mean that it claims the court is
boitnd by any and all evidence it may present and that
even the company's good faith - language of the statute
- is not a jury issue! Any evidence on the latter two
conditions of necessity inquires into the "mind of the insurer." In such situations there is always a jury question because of the bias and self-interest of those the insurer calls from its own ranks in an effort to persuade
the jurors it is "telling it like it is."
This was exactly what Prudential did at trial - it
called Dr. Albert H. Domm, its Western Medical Director, in effort to show it would not have insured Mr.
Ridd had it known Dr. Jones felt Mr. Ridd had cataplexy.
Significantly Dr. Domm does not work in Prudential's underwriting department and yet efforts were
made to have him testify what Prudential's underwriting
ing department would have done if Mr. Ridd's application had mentioned cataplexy.
It would have been easy for Prudential to have
called a proper person to testify on this matter. It also
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could have offered into evidence its underwriting policies
manual. That it failed to do so allows for an inference
that snch evidence would have been adverse. Londerholm
v. Unified School Dist. N. 500, 199 Kan. 312, 430 P.2d
188, 197 (1967). It is also a good example why juries
should not be bound by the testimony of an interested or
biased witness.
Dr. Domm's testimony was not binding on the jury
as Prudential asserts in its brief at page 32.
In Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P.2d 77
(1964), this court said that the self interest of a witness'
testimony may be sufficient for rejecting it and it is
proper for the jury to judge his testimony in that light.
See also Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v.
Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958) and Toma v.
Utah Power & Light Co., 12 Utah 2d 278, 365 P.2d 788
(1961), holding to the same effect.
Indeed, Instructions Nos. 4 and 9 told the jurors
they could judge the credibility of a witness and the
weight of the
in light of his bias and interest
in the result. Prudential made no objection to these instructions. See R. 467.
Dr. Domm's testimony concerning what Prudential's
underwriting department would have done in light of
other information could never have been binding on the
jury. If it was expert testimony the jury could have rejected it if they felt the reasons for the conclusions were
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unsound. If non-expert testimony, it was inadmissible
opinion evidence; the jury could n ject it. (Instrnctjon
No. 9-R. 235)
1

Prudential argues Mr. Ridd's application was misrepresented and incomplete as to question 5 (b) and ( c),
6(c), 9, 10, and 14. It further argues Mr. Ridd's good
faith in answering the application is immaterial; that a
''knowingness'' standard is erroneous.
In 43 Am. Jur.2d Insurance § 734 misrepresentation is defined :

"A 'misrepresentation' in insurance is a statement as a fact of something which is untrue, and
which the insured states with the knowledge that
it is untrue and with an intent to deceive, or
which he states positively as true without knowing
it to be true, and which has a tendency to mislead, where such fact in either case is material to
the risk."
If a "knowingness" standard is erroneous, it is significant that on Prudential's own form questions 5, 6, and
10 ask for "known indications"! What Mr. Ridd knew
was a question of fact for at least two reasons: the first
is the necessity of reconstructing what was in the mind of
a deceased; the second, whether what he knew would
have indicated to him a defect like those described. All
this points to good faith in answering.

Prudential contends that the "applicant's degree of
sincerity in giving a medical history, renders it illusory
... "(brief at p. 22.) This is contrary to the testimony
of its witness, Dr. Dornrn.
16

"Q. In other words, you people at Prudential
expect a guarantee when you get this application
A. We are not expecting anything, sir, except
honest answers to our question there.

Q. And you are entitled to a sincere and honest
answer?
A. That is correct." (R. 450)
If anything is illusory it is the insurance coverage
Prudential offered when it accepted Mr. Ridd's premium.

Instruction No. 12 states:
"In such case an applicant for insurance must
in good faith furnish all information known to
him .... " (R. 239)
Prndential made no objection to this instruction nor
does it now object but even states at page 41 of its brief:
"The court's instruction number 12 correctly
states the law with reference to the applicant's
duty of candor."
'fhe good faith standard can also be found in
Prudential's requested instructions numbers 8, 9, and 11
(R. 219, 220, 222). If the good faith standard was erroneous then Prudential was attempting to lead the trial
court to error.
Prudential asserts question number 9 was incomplete because it did not mention Mr. Ridd's visit to Dr.
Hughes on February 8, 1964 nor Dr. Jones' reference
to cataplexy.
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Prudential leans heavily npon the "past 5 years"
requirement of the que.stion. The visit to Dr. Hughes
occurred over forty months prior to the date of Mr.
Ridd's application.
Technically Mr. Ridd incompletely ans·wered the
question. He may have simply forgotten about the visit;
it is easy to lose track of whether the last visit to a doctor was five years when over 40 months have already
elapsed.
In any event Dr. Hughes gave Mr. Ridd a clean bill
of health as a result of that visit. Prudential cannot
avoid payment on this technically without showing the
omission materially affected the risk. If there was
enough substance to even present an issue on this score
the jury resolved the issue against Prudential.
Prudential's argument that Mr. Ridd's answers were
false because they didn't conform to the ultimate fact is
unrealistic.
In Moulor r. American Life l11s1trancc Co., 111 U.S.
335, 345 (1884), the Supreme Court said:
"In one sense, that only is true which is conformable to the actual state of things. In that
sense a statement is untrue which does not express things exactly as they are. But in another
and broader sense the word 'true' is often used
as a synonym of honest, sincere, not fraudulent."
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In Zolintnkis v. Eq_H.itable Life Assiirance Society,
97 F.2d 583, 587 (10th Cir.1938), the· court said:
"While strictly speaking this representation
was not true, we are of the opinion that reasonable
men in the exercise of honest judgment might
have reached different conclusions as to whether
the insured intentionally misrepresented his place
of residence and, therefore, the issue should have
been submitted to the· jury.
The conrt concluded that a misrepesentation does
not constitute a defense on a life insurance policy unless
it was intentionally untrue or made with a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity.
Since the testimony of
and Dr. Jones shows Mr.
and sincere, the issue was
whether the answers were
questionaire.

Mrs. Moore, Dr. Hughes and
Ridd's answers were honest
for the jury to decide as to
true or false on the medical

Question number 14 was a "give full particulars"
type of question.
The weakness in the argument that Mr. Ridd did not
give as complete of answers as he could have is seen by
examining the circumstances under which the medical
qnestionaire is actually completed.
Dr. Jung was employed by Prudential to examme
Mr. Ridd. Dr. Jung filled out the form and read the
questions to Mr. Ridd. There was substantial evidence
from which the jury have concluded Dr. Jung rushed
the whole process:
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1. He didn't arrive at the Ridd home to give the
physical until about 10.00 p.m. (R. 405).
2. He had already given three other exams that
evening with Mr. Ridd's being tht- last (R. 393).
3. His pregnant wife was home alone with a new
baby expected at any time (R. 393, 2SG).
4. He read the questionaire to .Mr. Ridd without explanation and completed the whole examination all in
taking only 20-25 minutes (R. 286-87) when the process
should take at least an hour (R. 338, 393).
While it may be correct that an applicant is bonnd
by answers even though actually written in by another,
the rule should not be strictly applied to the completeness of an answer.
Undoubtedly in such situations an applicant will relate to the examining doctor much more information than
the doctor places on the form. A doctor with the concerns Dr. Jung had that evening about his expecting wife
plus the lateness of the hour could be expected to edit the
information somewhat before placing it on the forms.
Even what he did writf' down was abbreviated. See
Exhibit 4-D.
Any risk of incomplete answers under such circumstances should be horn by the doctor's employer Prudential Insurance.
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Under the law Prudential asks this court to create
no man could purchase an insurance policy with any asi:nuance at all that his widow and children would ever
receive any benefits in the event of his death. It is
hmnan nature to forget some things. An insurer should
expect to accept some of the risks of human nature and
not foist upon a man's family, after his death, an unrealistic standard of p€rfection. Such a practice allows an
insurer to use one's premiums without any real coverage
being provided.
Prudential appears to be demanding complete disclosure while using incomplete forms.
No qm•stion asked if Mr. Ridd had ever been told he
had cataplexy.
The infrequency of loss of muscle tone plus the
doctor's continued assurances of good health undoubtedly
lead Mr. Ridd to believe he was in good health. It is only
normal for one to expect the questions asked by an insurer on its forms are concerned about significant health
problems and not trivia. See Franklin Life Insurance Co.
v. Wdlimn J. Champion & Co., 350 F.2d 115 (7th Cir.
1965 ).
"Where the answers are not warranties, an
applicant for insurance is not required to enlarge
upon the interrogatories in the application nor to
interpret them in any sense other than that which
and the circumstances of
the language
the inquiry suggest." 1 Appleman, Insurance
Law & Practice 211 (supp. 1971).
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Mr Ridd's answers were factually honest and complete. Any room for error or incompleteness was brought
about by the circumstances under which the examination
by Dr. Jung was performed and the language employed
by Prudential on its own forms.
The application for insurance is part of the policy.
Prudential drafted the application and medical questionaire. If its questions are so drafted as to not provide the
information it seeks then the company should redraft its
forms. Under the practice here involved, the practical
effect is to construe the ambiquities of the questions
against the insured! The law of Utah is to the contrary.
Christensen v. Farmers Insitrance Exchange, 21 Utah 2d
194, 443 P.2d 385 (1968).
Prudential's argument on TLC.A. 31-19-8 has another substantial error: it ignores the burden of proof.
PrndPntial actually issued the policy. As snch, it had
the burden of showing Mr. Ridd made material misstatements or omissions affecting th<c• risk, not plaintiff. Like\Yise it also had the burden of sho-wing frand or an underwriting practice which would haYP preventt•cl the policy
on Mr. Ridcl's life from having heen issned.
These standards on burden of proof "\Yere incorporated into Instruction No. 15 (R. 244). Prudential has
made no objection to this instruction.
There was substantial evidence that no fraud was
committed: Mr. Ridd was approached by Prndential to
purchase insurance, not vice-venm ( R. 283) ; his doctors
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stated his health was good in conformity with his statements (R. 313, 342); he was physically strong and active
and had never been told to restrict his activities in any
way (R. 281-82, 354).
There was also a real jury issue concerning whether
cataplexy materially affected the risk: Mr. Ridd had
never been injured through loss of muscle tone; all
doctors found Mr. Ridd in good health; cataplexy is not
mentioned on Prudential's questionaire; Mr. Ridd did not
restrict his activities in any way: such occurrences were
infrequent and not spontaneous (R. 290); he never had
an occurrence while driving; cataplexy is not a progressive condition.
The most favorable evidence also showed Prudential
would have issued the policy even knowing Dr. Jones'
comments about cataplexy: Prudential introduced no
underwriting policies manual or called anyone from its
underwriting department to testify what effect "cataplexy" on Mr. Ridd's application would have; no question
about cataplexy appears on Prudential's questionaire.
Indeed, if Prudential was to make a case at all, the
minimum finding the jury had to make was the existence
of cataplexy. On that issue Mr. Ridd's own doctors were
divided: Dr. Hughes felt the loss of muscle tone could
result from hyperventilation whereas Dr. Jones diagnosed cataplexy. Prudential offered no evidence in this
regard. The jury could have found Dr. Hughes' testimonv more believable and rejected the cataplexy theory.
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Prudential's efforts to urge narcolepsy were even more
fruitless; no one ever diagnosed narcolepsy. (R. 319,
346).
POINT III.
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY WERE PROPER

Prudential asserts error in the giving of Instruction
No. 14 (R. 242) and the failure to give its requested Instructions 10, 11and14 (R. 221, 222, 224).
Instruction No. 14 was patterned after U.C.A.
31-19-8. It states:
''Thus in this case you must de,termine:
(1) Whether in his application for insurance
the insured made any misrepresentation, or omissions, or concealment of facts, or incorrect statements; and
(2) If so, whether such misrepresentation, or
omission, or concealment of facts, or incorrect
statement, if any, were:
a. F'raudlent; or
b. Material to the acct>ptance of the risk of
insuring Ridd's life;
or whether the defendant in good faith would not
have issued the policy insuring Ridd's life if the
true facts, as required by the application, had
been made known to the defendant.
To be fraudulent , it must be shown by clear
and convincing proof that any misrepresentation,
omission, concealment of fact or incorrect statement made by the
Douglas Ridd, conconsisted of a false representation of a matf·rial
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fact, that it was clone with knowledge of the
falsity of such fact, or in culpable ignorance of its
truth, and with the intention that it be acted on
by the party deceived and that such false representation induced the party deceived to contract
with the party making the false representation to
the injury of the party so decieved.
In determining whether a misrepresentation,
omission, concealment of fact, or incorrect statement is material to the acceptance of the· risk on
the life of Mr. Ridd, you are instructed that if
knowledge of the truth of such fact would have
led a reasonably prudent insurer to decline the
application, then such misrepresentation, omission to the acceptance of the risk of insuring that
life.
Whether a life insurance policy would have
been issued had true answers been given in the
application, cannot be left to the determination of
the insurer after the death of the insured. That
matter cannot be settled by the mere pronouncement of the insurance company after the death
has occurred that had such true answers been
given, it would not have issued the policy, but the
matter misrepresented, or ommitted, or concealed
or incorrectly stated must be of such character as
to enable yon to say, would reasonably affect the
insurer's judgment as to the matter of assuming
the risk of insuring the life of Douglas Ridd under
the existing facts and circumstances. Material
representations made or omitted, in good faith
and without an intent to deceive, need not be literally true and accurate in every respect, but it is
sufficient if they are substantially true and correct as to existing circumstances. A lay person is
not obligated to know the technical meaning of
medical terms used, but only to know the· meaning
in common usage.
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Prudential objects to Instruction 14 for its "gloss of
'knowingness' placed by the court on the terms 'misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts and incorrect
statements' ... " Further objection is made because "the
last two paragraphs ... do not state the law with reiference to the insurer's standard of good faith."
Prudential's objection to the "gloss of knowingness
has been previously discussed. Suffice it to say at this
point that the "knowingness" element can be found in
Prudential's requested Instructions No. 8 - ''all facts
known by him or which should be known by him ... (R.
219)", No 9 - "one cannot knowingly conceal ... (R.
220) ", and No. 11 - "that its falsity was known ... ( R.
222)"
It is found only once in the given instructions 14 - where fraudulent is defined.

No.

It appears that Prudential felt more strongly about
the knowingness issue than the trial comt ! It can hardly
be heard to complain on appPal.

This court has repeatedly connseled that an instructi on,
"should be considered in its entirety, and along
with all of the other instructions given to determine -whether they accomplish what is essential:
explaining to the jury in a manner understandable
to them the issues of fact and the law applicable
thereto with reasonable accuracy, and with fairness to both sides." Badger T. Clayson, 18 Utah
2d 329, 422 P.2<1 665, 666 (1967).
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Prudential ignores the above principle in arguing a
defect in Instruction No. 14 from a failure to repeat in
the last two paragraphs the good faith standard applicable to an insurer.
The tenth line of instruction No. 14 very clearly
spells out the insurer's standard of good faith in accordance ·with Utah Code Ann. 31-19·-8. The last two paragraphs of Instruction No. 14, though they do not use the
term good faith with respect to the insurer, make it very
clear from such language as "reasonably prudent" and
"would reasonably affect the insurer's judgment," that
the good faith standard is that properly applied to the
insurer.
The good faith standard is also found on line 16 of
Instruction No. 13 ( R. 240) - "unless the insurer in
good faith would not have issued that policy . . . ", line
15 of Instruction No. 15 (R. 244) - "or that it in good
faith would not have issued the policy ... ", and again at
line 10 of Instruction No. 16 (R. 245) - "or that the defendant would have in good faith, nevertheless, issued
issued the policy .... "
In light of the many references in four different instructions to the good faith standard to be applied to the
insurer it cannot seriously be contended that Instruction
No. 14was prejudicially deficient in this respect.
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Even if there were some error in Instruction No. 14
Prudential is barred by Rule> 51, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, from raising this issue for the first time on
appeal.
Pn1dential did not raise this objection to Instruction
No. 14 below. See R. 468-69.
Where the Instructions given are correct and substantially cover the same matter in requested but refused
instructions, there is no error. Harrnon v. Sprouse-Reitz,
21 Utah 2d 361, 445 P.2d 773 (1968); Stratton 1.:. Nielsen,
25 Utah 2d 124, 477P.2d152 (1970).
Such was the case with Prudential's requested Instruction No. 10. This instruction states:
"Where an insured knowingly makes material
misrepresentation, proof of an actual conscious
purpose to deceive is not necessary. One cannot
knowingly conceal or misrepresent facts which
one knows would influence the risk or the issuance of the policy, and then be ht>ard to say that
he did not intend to deceive or dPfraud." (R. 221)
The substance of this instruction was covered in
Instruction No. 12 (R. 239), Instruction No. 14 (R. 243)
and Instruction No. 16 (R. 245).
Prudential's requested Instruction No. 11 dealt with
the knowingly making of a false statement with a view to
the procuring of insurance.
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The instruction is not clearly worded for laymen and
conld have tended to confuse the jury. In this respect it
would have failed to "enlighten the jury on its problems."
.Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse Co., 16 Utah 2d 186, 398
P .2d 24 ( 1965). It was therefore proper to reject ,the instruction.
Its substance was covered more clearly by placing
the legal principle in proper context by Instructions 12,
13 and especially the second paragraph of Instruction No.
14 (R. 239, 240, 242).
There was no error m refusing to give requested
Instruction No. 11 because no litigant has an absolute
right to have instructions presented in his own language.
Macshara v. Ga.rfield, 20 Utah 2d 152, 434 P.2d 756, 758
(1967).
Prndc>ntial's requested Instruction No. 14 states:
"It makes no difference that an insured's
death is caused by a condition other than that
misrepresented or concealed on an insurance aplication form. The question is rather whether the
misrepresentation, if any, was such that if the
insurer had known the true facts it would have
made further inquiry or would have been influenced materially in its decision to accept the
risk." (R. 224).
The substance of this instnrntion was covered in
Instructions 12 through 16 ( R. 239-245). It would have
been unnecpssarily repetitive to once again state its substanct>.
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"Appellants' theory of the case was adequately
presented to the jury and appellants are, therefore, not entitled to repetitious instructions belaboring appellants' points." Hole v. Womack, 75
N.M. 522, 407 P.2d 362, 366 (1965 ).
Prudential also failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 51 in objecting to the court's failure to
give its requested instructions 10, 11, and 14.
The purpose of taking objections is to allow the trial
court to correct error before a verdict is reached. This
can only be done if the court is told what makes the
giving or failure to give an instruction objectionable; a
simple "I object" is not sufficient. Employers' Mutual
Liabildy lrisurance Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 123 Utah 253,
258 p .2d 445, 450 ( 1953).
A review of the record shows that counsel gave no
reasons for his objections to the court's failure, to give
Prudential's requested instruction 10, 11, and 14. It
should not be allov,red to now raise these issues for the
first time on appeal.
Each of Prudential's arguments relating to instructions is defective for failure to comply with Rnle 51,
U.R.C.P.
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CONCLUSION
Over four years ago Mr. Douglas G. Ridd died leaving a widow and young family behind. Those who survived him have still not received any insurance, benefits
under Prudential's policy No. D-47-308-070, a policy on
Mr. Ridd's life purchased as a result of solicitations by
Prudential's agents.
Over this period of years Prudential's reasons for
withholding payment have not remained the same. Initially Prudential claimed concealment of a condition affecting Mr. Ridd's heart. Epilepsy was next alleged and
then finally cataplexy. Whether Mr. Ridd even had cataplexy was an issue upon which his own doctors could not
agree. They both agreed, however, that Mr. Ridd was in
good health and that there was no reason for him to restrict his enjoyment of sports and outdoor activities in
any way.
Even at trial Prudential did not produce any witness
who was involved in the decision to not pay benefits
under Mr. Ridd's policy.
The evidence most favorable to the verdict is that
Mr. Ridd was completely honest in his application for insurance. He had been healthy all his life, having visited
doctors only rarely. He had no reason to believe he had
any physical problems and thus no reason to hide anything from Prudential.
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Prudential was anxious to accept his premium making the policy effective from that moment. Howe-ver,
when the very eventuality occurred against which insurance is to protect - premature death - Prudential was
unwilling to keep its part of the bargain.
Whether Mr. Ridd had concealed anything material
from Prudential and what Prudential would have done in
light of more information were questions for the jury.
The jury unanimously resolved all issues in favor of
the plaintiff.
Their verdict should be affirmed and costs awarded
to the plaintiff.
To use defendant's own words, justice requires Mr.
Ridd's family "get their piece of the rock."
Respectfully submitted,
Raymond M. Berry
WORSLEY, SNO'V &
CHRISTENSEN
7th Floor Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for President
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